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Constitutional Comity: Mediating
the Rule of Law Divide
Catherine Adcock Admay*
When he was President of the Commission on the General
Assembly of the United Nations, Prime Minister Jan Smuts served
as principal drafter of the Preamble to the Charter of the United
Nations (Charter). ' South Africa went on to become a founding
party to the Charter. It never sought to terminate or withdraw from
its obligations under the Charter, including the human rights
obligations. Indeed, under the Charter, South Africa pledged to
take "joint and separate action" to bring about more effectively the
"achievement of [the Charter's human rights] purposes."2
Historically in South Africa, international law and national law
have had an uneasy relationship. In 1980, when the Group Areas
Act,3 one of the pillars of social, economic, and legal apartheid,
was under consideration by the Constitutional Court of that day,
the Supreme Court of Appeal declined to construe an ambiguity in
that Act so as to advance, however faintly, the human rights
purposes of the Charter.4 According to S. v. Werner,' within the
parameters of national law, the Charter had no legal significance.'
The rule that international law must first be transformed or
Professor of Law, Duke University; A.B., 1988, J.D., 1992, Yale University.
For an overview of Jan Smuts's involvement, see Christof Heyns, The Preamble
of the United Nations Charter: The Contribution of Jan Smuts, 7 AFR. J. INT'L COMP. L.
329 (1995).
2 U.N. CHARTER art. 56. Under Article 56 of the U.N. Charter, "All Members
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Id.; see also Burns H.
Weston, Human Rights, 6 HuM. RTS. Q. 257, 272 (1984) (arguing that because the
human rights provisions of the United Nations Charter are part of a legally binding
treaty, they "clearly involve some element of legal obligation").
Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 (repealed 1991).
4 S. v. Werner, 1981 (1) SALR 187 (A).
5 Id. at 187.
6 Id.; see also John Dugard, Some Realism About the Judicial Process and
Positivism: A Reply, 98 S. AFR. L.J. 372, 385-86 (1981) (arguing that the court could
have limited the Group Areas Act by invoking internationally protected human rights).
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incorporated into national law in order for it to be national law
kept the government from being forced to address the hypocrisy of
Jan Smuts's legend. South Africa could be bound by international
law at the international level, and not bound at the national level.
The Charter was a compact in bad faith.
This sort of uneasiness between international and domestic law
holds true across many national legal systems (also committed to
the incorporation method for reception of international law) and is
why any discussion about international law's "authority" in a
domestic court is always fraught with difficulty. Much is at stake.
I. Paradox of the Rule of Law
From the perspective of those seeking to enforce international
law, the very purpose of an international compact is to obligate
"joint and separate" action among the parties.7 National law is the
single most effective vehicle for the enforcement of international
law.8 For it not to be put to the service of international law is for
international law to remain abstract declaratory law, full of legal
authority but with nowhere to go.
More troubling is the fact that legal authority coexists with
lawlessness. The unmistakable lesson one learns from South
Africa's simultaneous endorsement of the U.N. and the
establishment of apartheid is that there is no reliable rule of law
when it comes to international-national law relations. A state can
voluntarily and expressly bind itself to one set of principles, on the
one hand, and simply ignore them on the other.
Paradoxically, what makes managing the relationship between
international and national law so difficult is that there are powerful
rule of law arguments on both sides of the authority divide.
International law, which derives its authority from tacit or explicit
consent of nation states, cannot accept national law as a defense to
violating an international law obligation.9 Constitutional Courts,
which derive their authority from national constitutional law, can
7 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 2, art. 56.
8 See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law
Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623, 626 (1998).
9 This is why the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties stipulates that "a party
may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform
a treaty." Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
339 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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never be expected to prioritize international law-however
authoritative-over constitutional law. To do so would be simply
inconsistent with a national law system that observes the doctrine
of constitutional supremacy."° Therefore, whatever the
Constitution says about the authority of international law will be
how much authority international law is accorded.
II. Inequality of Power
A national court can turn to two sources for authority in
deciding a given case, which creates the possibility of significant
slippage between what a state promises to do when it enters into
international obligations" and what its constitution will require it
to do to perform those obligations.'2 Often international law suffers
because it has no constitutional status-no pacta sunt servanda'3
principle imbedded in that constitutional law. If the principle that
states must comply with their obligations is only championed at
the international law level, international law obligations will take
on a quality of remoteness or external significance, regardless of
the extent to which the law was adopted, endorsed, or even written
by national actors. International law then comprises obligations to
others (that may be honored or not), and constitutional law
consists of obligations to ourselves (that must be honored). Having
two sorts of binding law-first class law (our Constitution), and
third class law (our international law obligations)-can quite
easily relegate international law to the status of empty declaratory
law, thinner than the paper it is written on. This may occur even in
the event that the parties involved have manifestly agreed to be
bound.
III. Managing the Paradox
South Africa's 1996 Constitution self-consciously attempts to
chart a course that does not easily founder in these ways. Its
10 S. AFR. CONST. ch I, § 2 (1996) ("This Constitution is the supreme law of the
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it
must be fulfilled.").
I The principle of pacta sunt servanda is embodied in Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention: "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith." Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 26.
12 See S. AFR. CONST. ch I, § 2.
13 Supra note 11.
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approach could broadly be viewed in these terms: We honor
ourselves by honoring the obligations we have undertaken to
others, and we empower our constitutional law when we empower
international law within it. The legal device invented to help
mediate the divide between these two systems of legal authority
was the development of a Constitutional Law of International
Law. 4
The success of this body of law is of no small importance to
international law generally. If South African law can demonstrate
that mutually supportive coexistence between international law
and national law is possible in a way that does justice to the rule of
law principle at the heart of both systems, it will have forged a
powerful legal and political instrument, and done so with much
better faith than did Jan Smuts.
The Constitutional Law of International Law adds a second
locus for the authority of international law. When international law
is constitutionalized, it is binding on national actors because
international law is constitutional law: its source of authority is the
Constitution itself. Therefore, one rule of law problem is solved.
IV. Road Map for the Enquiry
Several questions arise. What has become of South African
constitutionalization of international law? What is the effect of
locating international law's authority in constitutional law? And
how do South African law and courts receive international law?
To answer these questions, it will be necessary to engage in both
textual analysis (what the Constitution says) and substantive
analysis (what the jurisprudence says) of the role of international
law in real-world South African practice. It will become clear in
the course of what follows that the reception of international law
occurs in a way shaped by national judges who view national
context, history, and law as paramount (this is in fact the essence
of constitutional law), and that it is not a foregone conclusion that
this form of international law implementation ("taking
ownership") is good for international law. Whether international
law's rule of law problem is abated depends on whether
international law: (1) is viewed by national courts as a body of law
with an integrity of its own, apart from how it is formulated in the
14 See infra notes 15-100 and accompanying text.
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South African context; (2) is treated as an exotic species of
constitutional law not comfortably connected to the primary
constitutional law and not truly a part of the complex web of rights
the courts are spinning; or, (3) attracts the authentic interest of
courts who have to go to considerable extra trouble to make sense
of a system that is multiplicitous, evolving, and not under its
exclusive control. Thus, my investigation of South African
constitutional jurisprudence yields three basic models for relating
international and national law. When international law and
constitutional law meet: (1) international law is "read in;"'5 (2)
international law is "read out;"'6 or (3) national law is "read up."' 7
V. Constitutional Text
International law is powerfully boosted by what South African
jurists call a "straight forward reading" of the text of the
Constitution. "
First, much of the Bill of Rights was influenced by
consideration of international law. In its various versions
(including the Interim Constitution), the drafters of the
Constitution spoke in a language of human rights, a language that
would sound familiar to international law and become familiar to
constitutional law.'9 In this way at least the international law of
human rights would not depend on arid mechanical incorporation
but would represent a deep theme, a leitmotif within the
Constitution itself. Such deliberate attempts to promote
consonance ab initio could be viewed as a thick reading-in of
international law.
In contrast, a thin reading-in of international law can be found
in the principles the Constitution supplies for hierarchy (sections
1' See infra notes 38-55 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 56-81 and accompanying text.
'7 See infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
'8 This interpretive approach is similar to the "plain text" school of thought in
American legal construction. See, e.g., In re Sch. Educ. Bill 1995 (Gauteng), 1996 (3)
SALR 165, 185 (CC).
19 See LOURENS DU PLESSIS & HUGH CORDER, UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA'S
TRANSITIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 47 (1994); see also Jeremy Sarkin, The Effect of
Constitutional Borrowings on the Drafting of South Africa's Bill of Rights and
Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 176, 183 (1998); AZAR
CACHALIA ET AL., FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION 24-32 (1994).
2001]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
231, 232), comity (sections 233, 39), and context (section 36).
Sections 231 and 232 of the Constitution set forth the rules for
deciding when treaty law or customary international law is the
"law in the Republic."2 For international law to directly bind the
Constitutional Court in any way, it must clear section 231 or 232.
These sections also announce the hierarchy as between
international law and national law. Constitutionally, international
law can be displaced whenever international law is "inconsistent
with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament."2'
Absent more, this approach is disheartening for international
law champions. Section 231 treaties-now clothed as acts-are
only as good as the next piece of legislation. Such transformation
rules take us back to the familiar battleground of warring rule of
law imperatives: international rule of law is incompatible with
constitutional rule of law.
Under section 231, a treaty, to which South Africa has
specifically expressed its consent, may never come to have the
status of binding law in South Africa. If the Treaty does become
law in the Republic, it does so with a pedigree that privileges not
only constitutional law, but ordinary legislation as well. From an
international law point of view, this hierarchical arrangement
defies the basic ground rules of the Vienna Convention: first, that
treaties will be honored in good faith,22 and second, that internal
law may not be invoked to defeat a treaty obligation.
3
This blow to international law's rule of law core is softened by
two very powerful constitutional provisions, both of which
constitutionalize traditional (and traditionally poorly applied)
common law rules of comity. 14 They impose the following rules of
construction:
20 S. AtR. CONST. ch. XIV, §§ 231-32 (1996). Section 231(4) reads: "Any
international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by
national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been
approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the
Constitution or an Act of Parliament." Section 232 reads: "Customary international law
is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of
Parliament."
21 Id. ch. XIV, § 232.
22 Vienna Convention, supra note 9, art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339.
23 Id. art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339.
24 See S. AFR. CONST. ch. XIV, § 233, ch. II, § 39.
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§ 233
When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any
reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with
international law over any alternative interpretation that is
inconsistent with international law."
§ 39
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court ....
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom;
(b) must consider international law. 6
This constitutionalized comity gives all international law (not just
binding international law) two thumbs on the scale. First,
international law cannot be ignored; it must be ascertained and
considered (when interpreting the Bill of Rights or any piece of
legislation). Second, international law cannot be discarded lightly,
particularly where there is constitutional room to give it play. The
constitutionalized rule of comity means that international law, qua
international law, does have weight and its weight is protected as a
matter of constitutional law, that is qua domestic law.
Such a comity rule could be viewed as seeking to constitute a
new web of harmoniously read relations, not only as between
rights (freedom of religion, equality, security of the person, and
privacy), but as between sources of rights (international law or
constitutional law). So long as national law and international law
operate as different legal systems, this impulse toward mutual
accommodation on grounds that preserve both the international
and national law character of rights without a need for one to
dominate the other, seems calculated to reinforce both systems.
The final textual reading-in of international law on which this
article will focus appears only implicitly and is not clearly labeled
as an invitation to consider international law and comparative
practice, although the Court has been willing to see it in that
light." Section 36, a central pillar of South African constitutional
law, gives as a relevant context for a decision about limiting
25 Id. ch. XIV, § 233 (emphasis added).
26 Id. ch. II, § 39 (emphasis added).
27 See infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
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constitutional rights the democratic practice of other societies (not
just states). It states as follows: "The rights in the Bill of Rights
may be limited only . . . to the extent that the limitation is
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based
on human dignity, equality and freedom ....
A. From "Authority" to "Justification"
South African courts take pride in their ambition to move
legal-political discourse from a discourse expressing the "culture
of authority" to one imbuing a "culture of justification., 29 The dual
location of authority for international law in international law and
constitutional law might allow the Constitutional Court to move
the international-law-versus-national-law debate away from
warring "authority talk" and toward "justification talk." While
ultimately national authority is decisive in national courts, the
emphasis will be on broad inquiry into the mutual rationales and
grounding for international law and national law. In this way, what
counts as the relevant context or backdrop for legal analysis will
expand outward from the national heartland and not retreat inward
to a national laager.
B. Constitutional Court Jurisprudence
Because legal text is always given form in concrete situations
where specific interests are at stake, one cannot say what the state
of the constitutional law of international law in South Africa is
without looking to its constitutional jurisprudence. What follows is
a sample of cases drawn from two periods of constitutional
jurisprudence in South Africa to illustrate the juncture of life and
law. The cases selected show that the Constitutional Court has
taken three basic postures toward relating international law to
constitutional law: in Government of the Republic of South Africa
v. Grootboom° the Court reads international law in;' in Azanian
Peoples Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of
28 S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, § 36 (emphasis added).
29 Etienne Mureinik, Emerging from Emergency: Human Rights in South Africa, 92
MICH. L. REV. 1977, 1986 (1994).
30 2001 (1) SALR 46 (CC); see also Christian Educ. of S. Afr. v. Minister of Educ.,
2000 (4) SALR 757 (CC).
3' See infra notes 38-55 and accompanying text.
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South Africa,32 In re School Education Bill 1995 (Gauteng)
(leading judgment),33 and Coetzee v. Government of the Republic
of South Africa (leading judgment), " it reads international law
out;" and, in Minister for Welfare & Population Development v.
Fitzpatrick it reads national law up.37
C. Reading In: Grootboom
The Grootboom case" is of fundamental importance to South
African constitutional law. It poses some of the hardest questions
the Court can expect to field. How is the Court to respond to the
tragedy of fundamentally inadequate housing conditions in South
Africa?39 What sorts of standards can the Court craft to ensure that
socioeconomic rights in the Constitution are not dead letters?'
Justice Yacoob considered as sources of law both constitutional
and international law."'
The constitutional cornerstone for analysis is section 26, which
reads: "Everyone has the right to have access to adequate
housing.... The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realization of this right." 2 Justice Yacoob also turned to the
International Covenant for Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights.43 Article 11 explains that "The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to ...adequate ...
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.
The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the
32 1996 (4) SALR 671 (CC).
33 1996 (3) SALR 165 (CC).
34 1995 (4) SALR 631 (CC).
35 See infra notes 56-81 and accompanying text.
36 2000 (3) SALR 422 (CC).
37 See infra notes 82-96 and accompanying text.
38 2001 (1) SALR 46 (CC).
39 Id. at 53.
40 Id. at 65-66.
41 Id. at 63.
42 S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, § 36 (1996) (emphasis added).
43 Grootboom, 2001 (1) SALR 46, 64-65; Int'l Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, art. 11, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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realization of this right."" In addition, Article 2 states that "Each
State Party .. . undertakes to take steps ...with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights
recognized .... ""
Taking pains to point out differences in the plain text of both
these sources of law, Justice Yacoob nevertheless canvassed the
work product of the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights. 6 When he came to the point where he had to
decide whether the legislative measures undertaken by the state to
realize the rights protected by section 26 were reasonable, he
incorporated into the standard of reasonableness two principles
emerging from the Committee's own work overseeing the
implementation of the Covenant. 7 First, "a program that excludes
a significant segment of society cannot be said to be reasonable." 8
Second, a program that disregards the needs of the most
vulnerable or "leaves out of account the immediate amelioration of
the circumstances of those in crisis" cannot meet the
reasonableness test.49
International law institutions, in particular the Committee that
monitors the implementation of the International Covenant for
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, have proceeded down a
messy legal path by developing a "concept of minimum core
obligation."5 The Court recognized that this work could serve as a
conceptual guide for a constitutional court wanting to move
cautiously into the nearly untrodden territory of justiciable
socioeconomic rights. As Justice Yacoob put it, such a working
relationship with the Covenant's Committee makes sense at a
minimum for textual reasons; the language of "progressive steps"
in the Constitution was actually inspired by the Covenant.' What
should not be missed here is that South African jurisprudence will
44 Int'l Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 43, art. 11,
993 U.N.T.S. at 3 (emphasis added).
41 Id. art. 2 (emphasis added).
46 Grootboom, 2001 (1) SALR 46, 64-65.
47 Id. at 69.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 78.
50 Id. at 65.
11 Id. at 69-70.
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represent another sort of progressive step for international law and
will in turn become fertile ground for the workings of the
Committee. What was aspirational only in international law is now
enforceable in a leading Constitutional Court.
In the same judgment, the Constitutional Court also considered
the relationship between the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child 2 and section 28 of the Constitution.53 Justice
Yacoob explained: "The extent of the state obligation must also be
interpreted in the light of the international obligations binding
upon South Africa. . . Section 28 is one of the mechanisms to
meet these obligations. . . . The section encapsulates the
conception of the scope of care that children should receive in our
society."54 In both enquiries, constitutional law is read in the light
of international law, but international law enters most powerfully,
first, as a domestic standard (reasonableness test) and second, as
the substantive source of obligation which domestic law honors on
its own terms in its own context, specific to section 28.
It is worth noting that only the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child is directly binding on South Africa in the
international law rule of law framework.5 Thanks to the invitation
of section 39, the Covenant-not binding law as a matter of
international law or of domestic law-is nevertheless still given
considerable play.
D. Reading Out: Coetzee, Gauteng, et al.
Constitutional Court jurisprudence is not always so
comfortably connected to international law. There is a line of
jurisprudence that gives little quarter to international law. In this
line the Court can be seen as leaning away from comity and
toward hostility. A few important cases go so far as to read
international law out of any serious constitutional inquiry at all.56
52 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, reprinted in 28 I.L.M.
1448 (1989).
13 Grootboom, 2001 (1) SALR 46, 80-82.
14 Id. at 81-82 (emphasis added).
55 Justice Yacoob explicitly points this out in his judgment. Id. at 63 n.29, 81.
56 See Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. Pres. of the Rep. of S. Afr., 1996 (4)
SALR 671 (CC); In re School Educ. Bill 1995 (Gauteng), 1996 (3) SALR 165 (CC);
Coetzee v. Gov't of the Rep. of S. Afr., 1995 (4) SALR 631 (CC).
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In Coetzee, Justice Kriegler held that an act imprisoning
judgment debtors for contempt of court was unconstitutional. 7
Justice Kriegler stated as follows: "Because I base my decision on
the examination of the specific provisions of the sections at
issue... I do not find it necessary in this judgment to comment on
the procedure of other countries. ... Nor do I find it necessary to
consider the impact of... international human rights instruments
.... "" Clearly, international law was not law Justice Kriegler felt
that he must consider. Section 39's invitation to have regard for
international law was declined, at least in the public realm where
the judgment served as the only indication that international law
was considered.
It should be noted that Coetzee technically was decided outside
the section 39 framework. It was considered under the Interim
Constitution where the provision homologous to section 39 read:
"In interpreting the provisions of [the Bill of Rights,] a court of
law... shall, where applicable, have regard to public international
law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this
Chapter."59 It is possible that Justice Kriegler read out international
law on the theory that it was inapposite in a case examining
domestic legislation.
Justice Sachs viewed such an understanding of "applicable
law" as too narrow. He wrote a separate judgment, concurred in by
Justice Mokgoro, arguing that section 35 (the homologous
provision to section 39) "invites us to have regard to international
experience where applicable when seeking to interpret provisions
relating to fundamental rights" and, in this, it "requires us to give
due attention to such experience with a view to finding principles
rather than to extracting rigid formulae, and to look for rationales
rather than rules.
60
At stake was the culture of justification. "In deciding whether
or not sending people to [jail] for not paying their debts is
justifiable in an open and democratic society.., we need to locate
ourselves in the mainstream of international democratic
51 Coetzee, 1995 (4) SALR 631, 640.
18 Id. n.7.
59 S. AFR. CONST. ch. III, § 35(1) (1993).
60 Coetzee, 1995 (4) SALR 631, 662.
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practice."6' Justice Sachs might have said the Constitution itself-
the bedrock of domestic law-requires an open stance toward
international sources.
In re School Education Bill 1995 (Gauteng)6 2 held that a
national prohibition on language competency tests for admission
to public or publicly supported schools and on compulsory
religious education in those schools was constitutional.63 A number
of private Afrikaans schools had argued, on the basis of
constitutional and international law, that the government must
support schools that insisted on a common language and religion
so long as they did not discriminate on grounds of race.6"
Reading Justice Mahomed's leading judgment one would not
know international law arguments had been raised at all. No
footnote acknowledged them. No mention was made of
international law, except perhaps obliquely when the Court
ordered no costs against the petitioners "notwithstanding the fact
that the record was unjustifiably burdened by a large number of
unnecessary documents lodged on behalf of petitioners."65 Was
this a South African version of a Brandeis brief, marshaling
international law and constitutional law to insist on special
budgetary allocations to Afrikaans schools?
The only indication that international law arguments were
raised was when Justice Sachs opened his judgment noting, "We
were urged . .. to approach the [task of interpreting specific
provisions of the Constitution] in a... manner which took account
both of cultural realities in this country and of internationally
recognized principles relating to the protection of minorities."66
Lest this assertion of international law support go unexamined (or
unexamined publicly), Sachs proposed "to follow their argument
through to see if applying internationally accepted principles ...
would indeed suggest a different result, even if straining against
the text."67
61 Id. at 659.
62 1996 (3) SALR 165 (CC).
63 Id. at 208.
64 Id. at 171.
65 Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
66 Id. at 185.
67 Id.
20011
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The first sentence of his international law analysis, given its
powerful analytical claim, understandably might strike fear in the
heart of any judge sitting on a court where complex questions of
constitutional and international law would arise: "A review of the
literature by leading authors in the field suggests that over the
years there has been a firm movement from the concept of
tolerance of religious and other minorities, to that of protection of
national groups, to that of guaranteeing rights of individuals. 68
Yet, there is no sense in which this separate judgment is indulging
in ill-gotten academic virtuosity. Sachs uses the judgment as a
vehicle for engagement, for providing a principled justification-
in one more way, in one more medium-of the decision of the
Court. A petitioner having read the judgment could not come away
wondering if silence about international law should be taken to
mean that the Court was not confident of its posture in relationship
to international law.
The single most important constitutional case where any reader
of the Court's jurisprudence could detect a fundamental lack of
ease with international law is AZAPO. 69 Here the Court was faced
with an argument from family members of those tortured and
killed by the South African government that the legislation
authorizing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),
especially its Amnesty Committee, was not only unconstitutional
but also was in violation of international law.7" The international
law allegedly breached by the TRC arrangement was the (claimed)
requirement that states prosecute those responsible for gross
violations of human rights.7'
It takes no imagination to understand why Justice Mahomed
would have a hostile reaction to this international law condition
being superimposed on a foundational "deal" responsible for the
very Constitution he was interpreting. Justifying limits on a
68 Id. at 190.
69 Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. Pres. of the Rep. of S. Afr., 1996 (4) SALR
671 (CC).
70 Id. at 680.
71 Id. at 687 (citing article 50 of the first Geneva Convention, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1949), article 51 of the second Geneva Convention, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950), article 130 of the third Geneva
Convention, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950), and article 147 of the
fourth Geneva Convention, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950)).
[Vol. 26
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constitutional right from within a purely national law framework
made his job hard enough. If the impugned section of the Act were
unconstitutional, Justice Mahomed declared, the "inquiry as to
whether or not international law prescribes a different duty is
irrelevant to that determination. '72
It would be easy to read his judgment as suggesting that
international law was not linked to constitutional law in any thick
or thin sense. If the Constitution were correctly interpreted as
authorizing amnesty, he argued, "[t]he exact terms of the relevant
rules of public international law . . . relied upon by the applicants
would therefore be irrelevant."7 Then he dropped another
footnote.7 ' This note parenthetically set out why three blockbuster
sources of directly relevant international law should not be
considered applicable. 5 In essence, Justice Mahomed made a
rolling argument in the alternative. First, international law is
72 Id. at 688.
71 Id. at 689.
74 Id. n.29.
75 Id. This note reads in full:
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 apply only to cases of "declared war or of any
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties." (No High Contracting Parties were involved in the South African
conflict.) The Conventions were extended by art. 1(4) of Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted on 8 June 1977)
to "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against regimes in the exercise of their rights of self-
determination." Even if the conflict in South Africa could be said to fall within
this extension (this was not accepted by the Cape Supreme Court in the AZAPO
case referred to in footnote 56, supra), Protocol I could only become binding
after a declaration of intent to abide thereby had been deposited with the Swiss
Federal Council in terms of art. 95 as read with art. 96 of this Protocol. This
Protocol was never signed or ratified by South Africa during the conflict and no
such "declaration" was deposited with that Council by any of the parties to the
conflict. As far as Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II) (also adopted on 8 June 1977) is concerned, it equally
cannot assist the case of the applicants because it is doubtful whether it applies
at all (see art. I(]) to Protocol II), but, if it does, it actually requires the
authorities in power, after the end of hostilities, to grant amnesty to those
previously engaged in the conflict.
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irrelevant.76 Then, if it is relevant, it does not apply." Finally, if it
applies, it does not assist the applicants' case."8
On the least charitable reading, Justice Mahomed's comments
on international law could be viewed as bare conclusory
arguments. His judgment's high focus on hierarchy (using section
231 as the crucial starting point of analysis)79 evidences no
sensibility for comity and little desire for grounding judgment in a
broader international law context." It is often the case that
international law is read out precisely when the specter of conflict
between international law and national law appears to loom
irreconcilably-when some aspect of international law, if fully
ventilated in Sachs's fashion, might too greatly strain the words,
structure, and history of the Constitution.8'
What is problematic about this response to possible slippage
between international law and constitutional law is that when
international law is constitutional law, slippage operates to
undermine national law much more than international law. Failing
a constitutional precept that accords weight to international law
76 Id. at 688.
77 Id. at 689.
78 Id. at 688.
79 Id.
80 A more charitable reading would take account of the enormous effort Mahomed
had mounted to defend a political settlement that had taken on a constitutional cast both
structurally and textually. The AZAPO judgment was issued under pressure in less than
two months and no judges, not even the most international-law inclined, wished to add to
their jurisprudential worries. Only Didcott chose to write a separate judgment, which
clearly revealed the amount of worrying at least one judge had already done on the
national law-constitutional law issues. He concluded: "It is therefore with a sigh of relief
that I find myself free to say, as I end this judgment, that [I can join in the basic holding
of the leading judgment]." Id. at 704.
81 Many international law scholars have noted that Justice Mahomed could have
defended his judgment and the underlying "deal" in the very terms of international law.
See, e.g., John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience, 8
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 301-08 (1998); Transcript, Ninth Annual Stein
Center Symposium: The Role of Forgiveness in the Law, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 135 1,
1438-39 (2000). But see Ziyad Motala, The Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act, the Constitution and International Law, 28 CoMP. & INT'L L.J. S.
AFR. 338, 353-57 (1995); Ziyad Motala, The Constitutional Court's Approach to
International Law and its Method of Interpretation in the "Amnesty Decision":
Intellectual Honesty or Political Expediency?, 21 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 29, 57-58
(1996).
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fails the Constitution itself.
E. Reading Up: Fitzpatrick
A case decided in May of 2000 could well have gone the way
of the Coetzee, Gauteng, AZAPO line of cases.82 In Fitzpatrick, the
Court was asked, in the name of international law, to allow a
constitutional violation to go unchecked for two years after the
Court had declared the underlying national legislation
unconstitutional.83 What national court in the world would want to
uphold unconstitutional national legislation in order to vindicate
international law? The stage was set for a battle of warring
authority where international law would strike the core principle
of constitutional supremacy and emerge much the worse for the
showdown.
The issue in Fitzpatrick was whether the Constitutional Court
should set aside the suspension of the order of invalidity regarding
legislation completely barring the inter-country adoption of South
African children.84 The Minister of Welfare conceded that the
legislation was unconstitutional,85 and that it did not serve the
constitutional imperative of advancing the best interests of the
child in any matter affecting that child.86 But, she argued, the
legislation should continue in place for another two years while
the Ministry of Welfare drafted new legislation that would
implement South Africa's international law obligations under the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the standards it was
preparing to undertake within the framework of the Convention on
the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption.87 According to the Minister of Welfare,
South African law could not be relied upon to safeguard children
in keeping with international law and constitutional law standards
unless it was amended.88
The constitutional law was very clear: current legislation was
82 Minister for Welfare & Pop. Dev. v. Fitzpatrick, 2000 (3) SALR 422 (CC).
83 Id. at 424.
84 Id. at 427.
85 Id. at 424.
86 Id. at 426.
87 Id. at 430-31.
88 Id. at 430.
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invalid.89 But the international law was equally clear: current
legislation must be kept in place because it allowed South Africa
to meet (in an overbroad manner) its obligation to condition inter-
country adoption on the exhaustion of in-country options (what the
Convention of the Child calls the principle of subsidiarity). °
Justice Goldstone ended the conflict by focusing on the
common core of international law and constitutional law.9 Both
sources of law, he pointed out, were grounded in the principle of
protecting the best interests of the child.92 This means there was no
real conflict. Any deficit in national law would be cured by the
background principle of international law. No ongoing
constitutional violation could be justified on the purported deficit,
because given the constitutional rules of comity, there was in fact
no deficit. Thus, he concluded, "the concerns that underlie the
principle of subsidiarity, are met [by current law]."93 His reasoning
is provided in footnote 33:
Although no express provision is made for the principle of
subsidiarity in our law, courts would nevertheless be obliged to
take the principle into account when assessing the "best interests
of the child," as it is enshrined in international law, and
specifically in art. 21 (b) of the Children's Convention. This
obligation flows from the imperative in section 39(1)(b) of the
Constitution that "when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court,
tribunal or forum. . . must consider international law., 94
Those national institutions and national officers responsible for
adoption matters, Justice Goldstone maintained, would read up
national law. 5 Affected parties, both domestic and international,
could rely on this declaration of fealty of national law to
international law because national law (not international law)
guaranteed it. The Constitution, then, operates so as to meet
89 Id. at 427 (stating that in the Court's "firm view" the legislation absolutely
proscribing the adoption of a South African child by non-South Africans was
inconsistent with the Constitution).
90 Id. at 431.
9' Id. at 432.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 433.
94 Id. n.33 (emphasis added).
91 Id. at 433.
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international law obligations even when express domestic law is
not yet in place.96
VI. Conclusion
We have come full circle. Recall how the Werner court, when
presented with the Group Areas Act, failed to read up.97 That the
United Nations charter had not been converted into South African
law was the decisive legal fact.98 South Africa law existed apart
from international law. Not having a foothold or source of
authority internal to the constitutional order, it would exist in a
vacuum of real power. Now, in the era of Fitzpatrick, whatever
deficits might exist in national law vis-A-vis international
obligations, more often than not, national law can be relied upon
to supply the deficit through rules of construction privileging
comity.99
The possibility for slippage between international law and
national law has not been eradicated, but the starkness of conflict
between warring systems of law, each asserting "authority" over
the other, has been smoothed by according a double locus of
authority to international law, in both international law and
constitutional law.
As long as judges, lawyers, and parties seize on this
opportunity to read in or read up (not to read out), relations
between international law and constitutional law need not be
uneasy. Each system can meet its rule-of-law imperative. Even
more promising, each system can begin to shape what Justice
Mokgoro has called a "web of mutually supporting rights,"'00
ushered in now by national law, now by international law, now
together.
If only the framers of international law, of international
institutions, even of the United Nations Charter, had busied
96 This operation is not simply desired without any likelihood of being fulfilled.
The Fitzpatrick judgment orders the Minister to bring the Court's analysis to the
attention of children's courts and children's commissioners. Id. at 433, order 3.
97 S. v. Werner, 1981 (1) SALR 187 (A); see also supra notes 4-5 and
accompanying text.
98 Werner, 1981 (1) SALR at 187; see also supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
99 Fitzpatrick, 2000 (3) SALR at 422.
100 Curtis v. Minister of Safety & Sec., 1996 (3) SALR 617, 631 (CC).
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themselves building such a domestic-international web earlier in
the last century, the road from apartheid to democracy might not
have been so long, so brutal, so hard won.
